Legitimacy, Motivation, and Coordination in a Multistakeholder Partnership for Education in Emergencies: The Case of Vacaciones en Paz in Illes Balears

The concept of stakeholders emerged from management and organizational studies to understand how multiple actors influence and are influenced by institutional decision-making (Freeman, 2010). Stakeholder theory argues that organizations do not operate in isolation but depend on relationships with a range of actors whose expectations and resources shape their performance and legitimacy. These actors include shareholders, donors, employees, clients, communities, and regulators.

In the field of development cooperation, stakeholder theory has gained prominence as governments, international organizations, and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) increasingly rely on collaborative mechanisms to pursue shared objectives. Partnerships allow the pooling of complementary assets, such as financial resources, expertise, legitimacy, and networks, to address complex social problems that no single actor can manage independently (Gray & Purdy, 2018). From this perspective, coordination is a strategic process of negotiation among stakeholders with different interests and degrees of power.

Stakeholder interactions are rarely neutral in nature. They are shaped by asymmetries in access to information, decision-making authority and resources. Therefore, understanding partnership governance requires examining how asymmetries are managed. Scholars such as Bryson et al. (2006) have noted that successful partnerships tend to build collaborative advantages through deliberate efforts to balance power relations, ensure inclusiveness, and cultivate trust. When these mechanisms fail, partnerships risk reproducing dependency or symbolic cooperation rather than the genuine co-production of outcomes. Applied to development practice, stakeholder theory invites questions about who participates, whose interests prevail, and how collaboration is sustained when authority is dispersed. These questions are central to MSPs, particularly in humanitarian and EiE settings where accountability is diffuse and institutional incentives vary across actors.

While stakeholder theory highlights the diversity of actors and interests, legitimacy theory explains why these actors choose to participate and remain engaged. Legitimacy refers to the perception that an actor’s involvement or an institution’s actions are appropriate, desirable, or aligned with shared norms and values (Suchman, 1995). Three main legitimacy bases are commonly distinguished:

In MSPs, legitimacy operates as a form of social currency. Public institutions often seek legitimacy by demonstrating their accountability and responsiveness to citizens. Civil society organizations derive their legitimacy from moral and humanitarian claims. Private firms pursue legitimacy to strengthen their social licenses and corporate reputations (Glasbergen, 2011). These differing bases of legitimacy influence each actor’s motivation to collaborate and their preferred contributions.

Motivation and legitimacy are also dynamic in nature. They can change over time as political contexts shift or as the perceived benefits of cooperation evolve. Pattberg & Widerberg (2016) observed that long-standing partnerships often experience cycles of consolidation and decline, depending on whether actors continue to perceive their involvement as legitimate and rewarding. Those that renew this alignment endure; those that fail lose credibility and coherence. In humanitarian environments, where outcomes are uncertain and reliance on public goodwill high, maintaining legitimacy is not peripheral but constitutive of effective governance. Volunteers’ altruistic motivation produces relational legitimacy; consistent government funding generates pragmatic legitimacy; visible corporate support enhances reputational legitimacy. The interplay of these forms creates the “social glue” that compensates for limited formal authority in long-term humanitarian partnerships.

Partnership governance refers to the structures and processes through which multiple stakeholders manage their joint initiatives. The literature identifies several governance models, ranging from hierarchical coordination led by public authorities to horizontal networks that emphasize voluntary collaboration (Provan & Kenis, 2008). The choice of model depends on the context, power distribution, and resource interdependence among actors.

In development cooperation, effective governance requires a balance between inclusiveness and efficiency. Overly centralized structures may marginalize local actors, whereas loose networks can suffer from ambiguity and duplication. To address these challenges, scholars have emphasized meta-governance, which is the capacity of a lead organization or steering committee to provide strategic direction, monitor performance, and mediate conflicts without undermining autonomy (Sørensen & Torfing, 2009).

The literature also highlights the importance of trust, accountability, and communication in maintaining the coordination of care. Trust reduces transaction costs and allows flexible adaptation to uncertain environments (Bryson et al., 2015). Accountability mechanisms, both upward (to funders or authorities) and downward (to beneficiaries or communities), help to ensure transparency and learning. Finally, communication structures such as regular reporting, joint planning, and information sharing facilitate alignment across institutional boundaries. Too much formality risks bureaucratizing volunteers and stifling initiative; too little can generate ambiguity and fatigue. Sustainable MSPs balance flexibility with light institutionalization, allowing adaptive coordination while preserving shared norms.

The field of EiE seeks to guarantee access to safe and quality education for populations affected by conflict or disaster. Education is increasingly recognized as a human right and a tool for protection, psychosocial recovery, and social cohesion (INEE, 2024). However, providing education during protracted crises poses significant coordination challenges, including overlapping mandates among humanitarian and development actors, unstable funding cycles, and gaps in accountability.

Recent debates have emphasized the need to bridge the humanitarian-development divide through more integrated approaches (Nicolai & Triplehorn, 2003). This involves aligning short-term humanitarian responses with long-term system strengthening and sustainability. MSPs are particularly well suited to this task because they mobilize complementary capacities. Governments and public agencies provide policy frameworks and services; NGOs contribute community networks and moral legitimacy; and private actors supply specialized expertise or resources. However, sustaining such partnerships demands legitimacy not only among funders and authorities but also within host communities and among beneficiaries (Sinclair, 2013).

The VeP initiative sits precisely at this humanitarian-development intersection. It provides immediate protection and health care for Sahrawi children while nurturing long-term intercultural learning and solidarity networks between Spain and the Sahrawi camps. Its longevity invites analysis of the social mechanisms (legitimacy, motivation, coordination) that enable continuity under uncertainty.

The three theoretical pillars: stakeholder diversity, legitimacy-motivation alignment, and adaptive coordination, can be conceptualized as interacting dimensions that sustain cooperation over time.

These dimensions are analytically distinct but mutually reinforcing: legitimacy shapes motivation; motivation drives coordination; coordination practices reproduce or weaken legitimacy. This recursive relationship, shown in <Figure 1>, offers a lens to interpret partnership performance beyond output indicators, focusing instead on processes that maintain cooperation under resource constraints. The framework guides the research design: stakeholder mapping addresses the who; documentary coding explores why actors engage and remain legitimate; and longitudinal analysis captures how coordination adapts across years. Together, these methods examine how legitimacy, motivation, and coordination co-evolve to produce the enduring humanitarian-development partnership embodied by VeP.

Fig. 1. Analytical framework that informs the sustainability of MSPs Note: 1) Legitimacy diversity, motivational complementarity, and adaptive coordination interact to generate partnership resilience and long-term sustainability. The triangle represents a dynamic system rather than a hierarchy; arrows illustrate mutual reinforcement among the three dimensions. 2) MSPs, Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships.

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This study adopts a qualitative case study approach to examine VeP as an example of a MSP for EiE. Case study research is well-suited for exploring complex, context-dependent phenomena where multiple actors interact across institutional and sectoral boundaries (Yin, 2014). Focusing on a single initiative allows for an in-depth understanding of mechanisms, such as legitimacy building or motivational alignment, that cannot be captured by cross-sectional or purely quantitative approaches. The case-study approach was particularly suited to VeP because the program’s evolution depends on processes unfolding over time: annual cycles of recruitment, coordination, and feedback create a continuous loop between actors in Spain and in the Sahrawi camps. Capturing these iterative patterns required attention to temporal sequence, institutional context, and the relational nature of cooperation. The design is exploratory and explanatory. It seeks not to measure efficiency but to identify and interpret the underlying mechanisms that explain the partnership’s stability. It also responds directly to the call by Pattberg & Widerberg (2016) for more longitudinal, process-oriented analyses of partnerships in humanitarian and development settings.

Although VeP operates throughout Spain, each autonomous community manages its own implementation through local NGOs in coordination with the Sahrawi Delegation and Coordinadora Estatal de Asociaciones Solidarias con el Sáhara (CEAS)-Sáhara (the national umbrella network). To retain analytical depth, the study concentrates on the Balearic branch, coordinated by the Associació d’Amics del Poble Sahrauí de les Illes Balears (AAPSIB, 2023). This selection is theoretically and empirically justified on four grounds:

The analysis covers the period 2011–2019, because (i) it offers the longest continuous sequence of program implementation before the COVID-19 disruptions and the diplomatic tensions of the early 2020s; (ii) it spans multiple political cycles at the regional level, providing variation in institutional context; and (iii) documentary availability is consistent throughout these years, enabling systematic cross-year comparison.

The study relies on documentary analysis of institutional sources that record VeP’s activities, resources, and coordination processes. Documentary research is well established in development studies as a rigorous method for reconstructing organizational behavior and institutional evolution when ethnographic or survey data are unavailable (Bowen, 2009; Scott, 2014). Three main document groups were analyzed:

All files were retrieved between October and December 2023 from institutional websites and official archives. Each document was catalogued in a spreadsheet noting year, issuing organization, document type, and page length. When multiple versions existed, the most updated and complete version was used. To mitigate self-reporting bias, secondary press coverage and CEAS-Sáhara newsletters (CEAS, 2023) were used to cross-check key events (e.g., charter flight delays, funding renewals). Where possible, budget amounts and partner names were verified across at least two independent sources.

The analysis combined qualitative content analysis with stakeholder mapping. Following the procedure described by Bryman (2016), textual data were coded using the NVivo 12 qualitative analysis software. The coding followed an iterative process.

An initial round of open coding identified references to (a) project activities, (b) stakeholder participation, and (c) financial flow. These categories were refined into thematic codes corresponding to the analytical dimensions developed in Section II: stakeholder composition, motivation and legitimacy, and coordination dynamics.

Stakeholders were classified according to their sectoral affiliation (public, civil society, or private) and role (funding, coordination, service delivery, or advocacy). The frequency and context of references to each actor were used as indicators of their degree of involvement. Although the documents differ in length and focus, their standardized annual format allows for cross-year comparisons.

Stakeholder mapping was then conducted to visualize the interconnections among actors. Recurrent collaborations and funding dependencies were identified using co-occurrence analysis within the dataset. These maps provide an empirical basis for assessing the stability or fluctuation of stakeholder networks over an eight-year period.

Given the reliance on documentary sources, particular attention was paid to ensuring the credibility and robustness of the analysis. Reliability was strengthened through source triangulation, cross-checking information from NGO reports against CSR statements, government records, and media coverage to confirm participation and funding details. Temporal triangulation across eight consecutive years reduced the influence of exceptional events or short-term fluctuations, allowing observation of recurring patterns. All coding decisions and excerpts were documented, enabling transparency and potential re-examination. Although documentary analysis cannot fully capture the informal and interpersonal dimensions of coordination, the consistency of reporting across independent institutional sources enhances confidence in the validity of the findings.

Because the dataset consists of institutional documents, the analysis focuses on reconstructing the institutional logics and recurring coordination mechanisms that the actors themselves considered important enough to document. These sources illuminate formal responsibilities, resource flows, and procedural routines, but they also provide indirect clues regarding less visible practices, such as volunteer mediation, informal problem-solving, or trust-based cooperation, through recurring references and patterned omissions. By reading the material longitudinally, the study traces how these mechanisms consolidate over time and how different actors frame their roles in the partnership’s evolution. This analytical choice complements, rather than replaces, empirical detail that first-hand interviews could provide, and it guides the interpretation presented here.

Within this framework, three limitations should nonetheless be acknowledged. First, data availability varied among actors: while public institutions and major corporations produced regular reports, smaller organizations and volunteer groups rarely did, resulting in partial visibility of their contributions. Second, institutional documents are inherently self-reported and may accentuate achievements or downplay difficulties; this bias was addressed through media verification and comparison among sources. Third, the study’s focus on a single region and timeframe constrains generalization beyond the Balearic case. Despite these constraints, the longitudinal and multi-source design provides a robust and contextually grounded understanding of the partnership’s structure, evolution, and coordination practices. This foundation supports the analysis presented in the next section, which examines stakeholder composition, motivations, and governance dynamics.

VeP operates as a decentralized, multi-level partnership linking Sahrawi refugee institutions with Spanish regional and local governments, NGOs, and private contributors. The national coordinating body, the Coordinadora Estatal de Asociaciones Solidarias con el Sáhara (CEAS-Sáhara), provides overall guidance, while regional associations implement local logistics in collaboration with the Delegación Saharaui para España. In Illes Balears, coordination is led by the AAPSIB, which acts as a boundary organization between host families, public institutions, and the Sahrawi delegation. AAPSIB manages the recruitment of host families, documentation, medical coordination, and communication with camp authorities. The regional government (Govern de les Illes Balears) and several municipal councils provide financial and logistical support, while the regional public health service (IB-Salut) ensures medical screening for all participating children.

This configuration reflects a hybrid coordination pattern that combines formal agreements (for funding and medical procedures) with informal, trust-based collaboration among volunteers and private actors. Over time, this arrangement has stabilized into a resilient local network (<Figure 2>).

Fig. 2. Stakeholder map of VeP implementation in Illes Balears Note: 1) AAPSIB serves as a coordination hub connecting public institutions (regional government, IB-Salut, municipalities), civil-society organizations (host families, volunteers, local associations), and private actors (clinics, AENA, Air Europa). Arrows indicate coordination and information flows. Dashed arrows represent informal and changing ties. 2) VeP, Vacaciones en Paz; AAPSIB, Associació d’Amics del Poble Sahrauí de les Illes Balears.

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Between 2011 and 2019, VeP in Illes Balears hosted approximately 90–100 Sahrawi children each summer, depending on mutual agreements between the authorities, host-family availability, and the regional budget. This pattern is confirmed in AAPSIB’s annual reports, which record participation figures in the high 80s to mid-90s throughout the period, reflecting the program’s ability to maintain continuity despite fiscal austerity and political turnover.

As shown in <Figure 3>, after a dip in 2011 following the entry of the conservative party both at regional and national levels, funding patterns have mirrored this steady participation. As reported in their Cooperation Strategy documents, the regional government’s annual grants cover transportation, insurance, and administrative costs; municipal councils co-finance cultural activities. Private partners provide in-kind or CSR contributions (optical and dental services, logistical aid). Although the total budget fluctuated modestly year-to-year, no campaign was suspended during 2011–2019.

Fig. 3. Annual participants, funding in VeP Illes Balears, and party in government, 2011–2019 Note: 1) Bars (left axis) show the number of children hosted; line (right axis) indicate the total annual funding (in €). The arrows under the graph show the leading party in both the regional and national governments. 2) VeP, Vacaciones en Paz.

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The partnership’s durability depended first on its composite legitimacy. Public institutions contributed procedural and pragmatic legitimacy through formal agreements, funding, and institutional oversight, while civil associations supplied moral legitimacy anchored in humanitarian values and community trust. Private firms and foundations added reputational legitimacy by associating with a socially respected cause. As the findings showed, these different forms were not competing but mutually reinforcing: when governmental resources contracted during the 2012–2013 austerity period, the moral credibility accumulated by AAPSIB and the hosting families preserved social support and justified continued in-kind contributions. In theoretical terms, legitimacy heterogeneity compensated for fluctuations in any single source, validating the assumption that plural legitimacy enhances collective stability in MSPs.

This plural legitimacy activated distinct yet compatible motivations. Public actors were primarily driven by accountability and policy continuity, civil organizations by humanitarian commitment and social recognition, and private partners by reputational and relational returns. The findings revealed that these asymmetric motivations, instead of fragmenting the initiative, created a balance of short- and long-term incentives: pragmatic goals such as logistics and health screening relied on public routines, whereas the moral drive of volunteers maintained inter-annual engagement even when tangible benefits were limited. This pattern substantiates the framework’s claim that legitimacy diversity energizes complementary motivations, which in turn sustain participation despite uneven capacities or rewards.

The analysis identified a light meta-governance structure centered on AAPSIB that facilitated routine coordination without formal hierarchies. Annual planning meetings, role delegation to the regional health service, and constant informal communication between families and volunteers allowed the partnership to function with minimal bureaucracy. This configuration exemplifies adaptive coordination: low formalization preserved flexibility, while shared moral reference points provided coherence. At the same time, this reliance on minimal formalization and interpersonal trust generates a clear governance trade-off. The flexibility that enables rapid problem-solving and supports volunteer autonomy also weakens downward accountability and leaves important expectations, such as follow-up communication with the camps or criteria for task delegation, only partially specified. In practice, AAPSIB’s coordinators must therefore act as informal accountability mediators, translating concerns between families, public partners, and Sahrawi authorities in the absence of more detailed procedural guidelines. This case illustrates how informal governance can sustain continuity, but only by concentrating interpretive and relational responsibility in the hands of key civil-society actors. The empirical evidence of consistent pre-departure medical examinations and host-family matching across years supports the proposition that coordination is effective when legitimacy and motivation are already aligned. Coordination thus operationalized the legitimacy–motivation nexus, converting moral commitment into stable organizational routines.

These three dimensions reinforced one another through iterative feedback. Moral legitimacy inspired continuing volunteer motivation; repeated successful coordination, in turn, generated new legitimacy for public and private actors. For instance, the visibility of local solidarity events not only motivated host families but also legitimized public co-financing. Over time, the partnership produced a self-sustaining cycle in which successful coordination renewed the credibility and motivational energy that had initiated it. This process validates the triangular model represented in <Figure 1>.

While rooted in the Balearic Islands, the mechanisms observed here offer insights for other EiE MSPs. These insights can be operationalized in comparable settings by adopting VeP’s light meta-governance model: assigning a boundary NGO to coordinate volunteers and public services, using simple but recurring procedures (e.g., annual health checks, host-family screening), and relying on low-bureaucracy agreements with service providers. These design elements offer a practical template for EiE planners seeking to stabilize partnerships with limited resources. The VeP case shows that resilience emerges less from scale or resources than from the alignment of legitimacy bases, motivational asymmetries, and adaptive coordination. However, replication presupposes a dense civic environment and trustful relations among actors, conditions that may not exist in more fragmented or resource-scarce settings. Future comparative research could examine whether similar feedback dynamics operate in contexts where local associations are weaker or where institutional legitimacy is contested. Given the study’s reliance on documentary sources from a single regional branch, these implications should be interpreted as context-sensitive design hypotheses rather than universal prescriptions. The mechanisms identified: complementary legitimacy, motivational reciprocity, and adaptive coordination, are analytically transferable but may not apply in settings with weaker civic networks or contested institutional trust.