Journal of International Development Cooperation
Korea International Cooperation Agency
연구논문

# Improving Korea’s Climate Finance for Developing Countries: Policy Analysis of the Management of Climate-Related Development Finance (CRDF)

Youngwoo Kim1,*
1KOICA
*Corresponding author : Youngwoo Kim (Director, Performance Management Team, KOICA, Korea) (kyw0490@koica.go.kr)

© Copyright 2020 Korea International Cooperation Agency. This is an Open-Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/) which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Received: Oct 10, 2020; Revised: Nov 16, 2020; Accepted: Nov 30, 2020

Published Online: Nov 30, 2020

## Abstract

No country can be free of global warming and incremental natural disasters. This is true especially of developing countries, which are the most vulnerable to climate change. Although developed and developing countries agreed to mobilize USD 100 billion per year to support developing countries by 2020, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has transferred only about USD 58.5 billion, on average over 2015 to 2018, to developing countries. Korea, one of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members, has a considerable gap between its contribution and its target. This is due to several reasons such as the lack of official development assistance (ODA) as a primary public resource for developing countries, limitations of other forms of public climate finance, and the low level of public-private partnerships (PPP) related to climate change.

This study analyzes Korea’s climate finance, mainly climate-related development finance (CRDF)) as a part of ODA. It suggests a strategy for solving the issues faced by the Korean government with a policy analysis approach.

Keywords: Climate Change; Climate Finance; Official Development Assistance (ODA); Climate-Related Development Finance (CRDF); Public Private Partnership (PPP)

## I. INTRODUCTION

Every country faces global warming and incremental natural disasters, but developing countries are more vulnerable to climate change. One of the main concerns to deal with climate change issues is the lack of finance for developing countries. While the annual mobilizing target is USD 100 billion, the current average transfer from developed countries to developing countries is the only USD 58.5 billion from 2015 to 2018. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines that Climate-related development finance (CRDF) is comprised of official development assistance (ODA), other official flows (OOF), and private investment for developing countries. However, in terms of data collection issues, ODA is the most substantial part of the current CRDF based on regular reports by Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries.

Being the 8th largest CO2 emitter globally, Korea does not fulfill its responsibility for supporting developing countries in that respect. Besides, the Korean government needs more cooperation with developing countries to meet its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) goal by 2030. However, the Korean government has not allocated a sufficient budget and could not adopt appropriate interventions to cooperate with developing countries. So, the Korean government needs a strategy to increase climate finance from public and private resources by endorsing effective policy measures.

Considering the amount of CO2 emissions of Korea, the Korean government needs to set a long-term goal of contributing 0.3% of ODA per gross national income (GNI), and 30% of CRDF/ODA, by 2030. These rates of goals are approximately two times more than the results of 2018. However, there are several problems to hinder the mobilization of climate finance with some root causes: bureaucratic failure contributes to the fragmented implementation of CRDF from ODA; diffusion of authority in climate change policy implementation limits the government’s capacity to manage public climate funds; while information asymmetry and the problem of uncertainty hinder private climate investment. This study analyzes Korea’s climate finance, mainly CRDF as a part of ODA, and suggests a strategy for solving the Korean government’s issues with a policy analysis approach.

## II. CONTEXT OF THE PROBLEM

1. Background
1) Developing countries’ vulnerability to climate change

Climate change is a common challenge of our time; however, it affects poor and vulnerable people the most. The poor are more exposed to climate change risks, and “climate shocks result in higher relative losses for poorer populations, who are less equipped to recover from such extreme incidents” (OECD, 2018: 95). Furthermore, the losses from climate-related weather shocks will continue to grow in the future because of the accumulation of people and assets in high-risk areas, shocks that are more frequent and greater in scale, and the lack of proper financial protection tools (Campillo et al., 2017: 7). For example, in Peru, the occurrence of one additional natural disaster per year could cause a regional poverty rate increase of 16%–20% (OECD, 2018: 96).

2) Development aid and climate finance for developing countries

The overall volume of the ODA on a cash basis in 2018 was USD 164.4 billion, coming from member countries of the DAC, Arab countries, and non-DAC countries (OECD, 2019b: 7). Net ODA from DAC countries reached USD 149.3 billion, 0.31% of GNI, representing a fall of 2.7% in real terms compared to 2017 due to the reduced spending on in-donor refugee costs for many DAC members (OECD, 2019b: 2). In parallel, as climate change accelerates, the needs for climate finance have increased. In the Paris Agreement in 2015, the countries agreed that “developed country parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the convention" in Article 9 (UNFCCC, 2015: 13). The Paris Decision reaffirmed the USD 100 billion goal, which has been reached at the conference of parties (COP) in Copenhagen in 2009 (UNFCCC, 2015: 17).

However, USD 100 billion’s annual target to address climate change is quite ambitious because the average transfer from developed countries to developing countries from 2015 and 2018 was the only USD 58.5 billion (Buchner et al., 2019: 24). Considering that most developed countries have not met their target, 0.7% of ODA/GNI, countries could understand both goals of development aid and climate finance are quite challenging at the current level. Also, developed countries have been required to acknowledge climate finance as a “new and additional” resources over the commitment of 0.7% because of the role that developed countries played in causing current and forthcoming climate change risks (Gupta, 2009: 210).

3) Overview of climate finance and CRDF

Climate finance has been one of the main issues under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). As a milestone of climate finance negotiations, the establishment of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) as a financial mechanism under the UNFCCC was endorsed, and in 2009 developed countries agreed to mobilize USD 100 billion per year “new and additional” funds by 2020 to assist developing countries (Cui & Huang, 2018: 173). Since 2010, the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) under the UNFCCC has been tracking both public and private climate finance flows (UNFCCC, 2018: 9).

According to the 2018 biennial assessment by the SCF, climate finance, which is not only for developing countries but as a whole amount, flows increased by 17 percent in the period 2015–2016 compared to the period 2013–2014 (UNFCCC, 2018: 6). High-bound climate finance estimates increased from USD 584 billion in 2014 to USD 680 billion in 2015 and USD 681 billion in 2016 (UNFCCC, 2018: 6). The public climate finance includes the government budgets, finance from the development finance institutions (DFIs), and climate funds. The private climate finance consists of investment by corporate actors, households, and project developers, including private equity, venture capital, and infra funds (Oliver et al., 2018: 5). Also, the Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) report shows that private climate finance has continuously been more considerable than the public one since 2013 (Buchner et al., 2019: 3). Despite the smaller scale of public sources to private investment, public sources are still critical because it is possible to leverage private finance approximately with a ratio of 1:5 (World Economic Forum, 2013: 7).

According to the OECD, CRDF includes parts from ODA, OOF, private grants, and private amounts reported by DAC and non-DAC members for developing countries (OECD, 2018: 2). The most substantial proportion of CRDF is from ODA, the public resource (See <Figure 1>). Although CRDF could not show all the efforts by the country to mobilize climate finance for developing countries, it would be inevitable to analyze the flow of climate finance at a country level.

Figure 1. Scope of CRDF between ODA, OOF, and Climate Finance CRDF, Climate-Related Development Finance; ODA, Official Development Assistance; OOF, Other Official Flows.
4) Korea’s CRDF

The data of Korea’s CRDF consists mostly of grants and a debt instrument. These are concessional and developmental finance from the public sources, and all amounts would be counted as ODA1). Since 2013, although Korea’s ODA has increased continuously, the CRDF has fluctuated without an increasing trend in terms of volume and proportion (See <Table 1>).

Table 1. Korea’s CRDF (2013-2018, current million $) Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Grants (% of total) 142.24 (46.6%) 134.80 (93.1%) 176.45 (48.0%) 185.19 (51.3%) 227.17 (56.4%) 286.57 (82.3%) Debt instruments (% of total) 162.75 (53.4%) 10 (6.9%) 191.29 (52.0%) 176.08 (48.7%) 175.60 (43.6%) 61.59 (17.7%) CRDF (Total)2) 304.99 144.80 367.74 361.27 402.77 348.16 ODA commitment3) 2,238.2 2,378.33 2,310.29 2,458.13 2,444.12 2,850.43 CRDF/ODA (%) 13.6 6.1 15.9 14.7 16.5 12.2 Source: Climate Change: OECD DAC External Development Finance Statistics, reorganized by author. CRDF, Climate-Related Development Finance; ODA, Official Development Assistance. This data suggests the Korean government did not have a road map or a specific plan to extend CRDF despite ODA’s rise for the last years. Also, there was no particular allocation ratio between grants and debt instruments for CRDF at a planning stage by the government. In 2014, both the amount of CRDF,$144.80 million, and the ratio of CRDF to ODA, 6.1% are the lowest. There might be some data collection issues because of the massive amount of non-concessional funds, which is not consistent with other years’ data.

2. Significance of the Problem

Without contributing to climate finance for developing countries, Korea can result in the “naming and shaming” situation in the global community as a massive CO2 emitter. Korea is the 8th largest CO2 emitter in the world and the 4th largest among OECD DAC countries in 2018 (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2020). In terms of per capita emission, Korea is the 6th heaviest globally and the 4th heaviest among OECD DAC countries (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2020). As the socio-ecological model shows the relationship around climate finance issues, the challenge of addressing climate change is complicated by the variety of stakeholders (See <Appendix 1>). Korea has been ranked quite poorly in many environment, and development indicators, for instance, as 57th out of 60 countries in climate change performance index (Germanwatch, 2018); 27th out of 27 countries in the commitment to development index 2018 (Center for Global Development, 2018); and “highly insufficient group,” in which the government’s policy could make global warming between 3°C and 4°C, not consistent with Paris Agreement’s goal below 2°C (Climate Action Tracker, 2019). It means that Korea has a more significant responsibility not only to make an effort to reduce CO2 emissions but also to assist developing countries in addressing the hazards of climate change. The burden-sharing framework for climate finance, which is associated with historical responsibility, ability to pay, and equity, suggested the required level for Korea between 1.6% and 4.5% of the total. Still, Korea’s contribution to the GCF has been only 1% of the total resource (Moon, 2016: 228).

The Korean government needs more cooperation with developing countries to meet its goal of NDC by 2030. The greenhouse gas (GHG) Mitigation Roadmap by the 2030 year set the goal to reduce emission in total 37% compared to business as usual (BAU), 32.5% from the domestic industries and the rest 4.5% from the forest absorption and reduction in other countries (Government of Korea, 2018: 5). According to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, “some Parties choose to pursue voluntary cooperation in the implementation of their NDC” (UNFCCC, 2015: 7). To “hold the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels”, every country should use various approaches and cooperate. Korea also needs to meet not only its goal of NDC but also global target through cooperation with other countries and should contribute more climate finance and technology towards the efforts of developing countries. However, the Korean government thus far has not allocated sufficient budget resources and did not adopt appropriate cooperation initiatives in developing countries. Therefore, the Korean government needs a strategy to increase climate finance from both public and private resources by endorsing effective policy measures.

3. Prior Efforts and Their Assessment

The Korean government has used CRDF as a primary public source to address climate change issues in developing countries. CRDF is disbursed by the Ministries and governmental aid agencies, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Ministry of Economy and Finance (MOEF), Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), Export-Import Bank of Korea (Korea Eximbank), and other agencies. KOICA implemented 338 grant projects with $76 million, and Korea Eximbank managed$61 million for a project using debt instruments in 2018 (See <Table 2>). While KOICA worked on 70.9% of total projects, with only 21.7% of the total budget, other agencies implemented 24.7% of entire projects, with 45.4% of the total budget.

Table 2. Korea’s CRDF by implementing agency in 2018 (current million $) Agency KOICA Korea Eximbank MOFA MOEF Other agencies Total Number of projects 338 (70.9%) 1 (0.2%) 6 (1.3%) 14 (2.9%) 118 (24.7%) 477 (100%) Amount 76 (21.7%) 61 (17.7%) 14 (4.1%) 39 (11.1%) 158 (45.4%) 348 (100%) Source: Climate Change: OECD DAC External Development Finance Statistics, reorganized by author. CRDF, Climate-Related Development Finance; KOICA, Korea International Cooperation Agency; MOFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; MOEF, Ministry of Economy and Finance; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Within this structure, the Korean government sometimes initiates special pledges on climate change. For example, the Korean government designated KOICA as an operating agency for the East Asia Climate Partnership (EACP) from 2008 to 2012, spending USD 200 million to deal with climate issues in developing countries (Office for Government Policy Coordination, 2013). After that, KOICA announced a plan to support climate change mitigation and adaptation with USD 100 million from 2021 to 2025 in the 1st KOICA Climate Action Partnership Forum (Wang, 2019). Furthermore, the Republic of Korea president, Moon Jae-in, pledged that Korea doubles its contributions to the GCF and hosts the second P4G Summit in 2020 (The president of Korea, 2019). P4G is “a network of global leaders and innovators seeking breakthrough solutions for green economic growth”; it “accelerates, funds and recognizes innovative public-private partnerships” (P4G, 2019). However, such one-time commitment is not a sustainable scheme to attract private investment for climate issues in developing countries. Although the Korean government wants to develop cooperation with the private sector through P4G, the scale of support is relatively small because primary beneficiaries of the program are early-stage companies. On top of that, the CRDF could be increased through other public climate financial resources. As <Figure 1> shows, incremental public climate finance through emission trading schemes (ETS), green bonds, or a carbon tax would bring more resources for cooperation with developing countries. The Korean government has issued six green bonds of$2.05 billion by four issuers, but this amount is still small compared to global needs (Climate Bond Initiatives, 2018: 4). Korea Eximbank was the first issuer to come to market in 2013 and the only repeat issuer to date, accounting for 46% of total issuance (Climate Bond Initiatives, 2018: 5). Since 2015, the Korean government has been operating ETS to reduce GHG emissions. However, the Korean government did not have the experience to use financial resources from the ETS because the allowance was distributed free of charge to the participants in phase 1 from 2015 to 2017 (Asian Development Bank, 2018: 15). On the other hand, because 3% and 10% of the allowances are auctioned, respectively, in Phase 2 (2018–2020) and Phase 3 (2021–2025) (IETA, 2016: 4), there would be an opportunity to use this revenue for developing countries.

## III. PROBLEM ANALYSIS

There are three main reasons why Korea’s climate finance is insufficient: shortage of ODA and its fragmented implementation, lack of other public climate finance, and low level of public-private partnerships (See <Appendix 2>). While there are various factors that contribute to the problem, its leading root causes are the following: bureaucratic failure, diffusion of authority, information asymmetry, and the problem of uncertainty.

1. Bureaucratic Failure Makes Fragmented CRDF Implementation

Korea has been the 8th largest country by GNI among 29 countries of the OECD DAC in 2018 (The World Bank, 2019). However, ODA in 2018 on a grant equivalent basis is 15th as of USD 2,351 million, and the ODA per GNI is 0.15%, ranked 24th (OECD, 2019b: 6). Although Korea’s ODA has increased gradually since 2010 (OECD, 2020b), it is substantially lower than its economic rank. While the Korean government initially set up its ODA/GNI goal of 0.25% by 2015 (OECD, 2018: 351), the target was not achieved and was changed to 0.20% by 2020 (MOFA, 2015). However, it is expected that the second goal would not be met by 2020 as well. The Korean government usually prioritizes domestic issues over foreign policy concerns, and the ODA budget is easily sacrificed to urgent domestic needs, which are more politically expedient for the administration. This insufficient ODA could limit CRDF because a public source of CRDF comes almost from ODA. In 2018, Korea’s CRDF, USD 348 million, and CRDF per ODA, 12.2%, was lower than the average of DAC countries, respectively, USD 1,183 million and 22.2% (See <Table 3>).

Table 3. DAC countries’ CRDF and CRDF/ODA in 2018 (current $) Country CRDF (mil.$) CRDF/ODA CRDF/ODA (rank)
1 Japan 10,673 0.553 1
2 Germany 8,841 0.350 4
3 United Kingdom 3,112 0.389 3
4 France 2,349 0.248 12
5 Sweden 1,683 0.403 2
6 United States 1,426 0.046 28
7 Netherlands 1,080 0.292 7
9 Norway 804 0.201 16
10 Switzerland 504 0.201 17
11 Australia 467 0.183 20
12 Italy 439 0.188 19
13 Denmark 387 0.234 14
14 Spain 367 0.304 6
15 Belgium 360 0.307 5
16 Korea 348 0.122 22
17 Finland 159 0.227 15
18 Austria 142 0.279 9
19 Ireland 90 0.170 21
20 New Zealand 84 0.201 18
21 Poland 77 0.288 8
22 Luxembourg 36 0.102 24
23 Portugal 15 0.093 25
24 Iceland 11 0.268 11
25 Czech Republic 11 0.106 23
26 Slovenia 10 0.276 10
27 Greece 6 0.085 26
28 Hungary 3 0.022 29
29 Slovak Republic 2 0.061 27
Average 1,183 0.222

Source: Climate Change: OECD DAC External Development Finance Statistics, reorganized by author.

DAC, Development Assistance Committee; CRDF, Climate-Related Development Finance; ODA, Official Development Assistance; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

On the other hand, Japan, Germany, and France are top donors of CRDF. For comparison, the three countries would be good examples because they are top donors and have similar ODA structures to Korea. Korea and the three countries are the top five countries for high loan shares in gross bilateral ODA in DAC countries (See <Figure 2>).

Figure 2. Share of loans in gross bilateral ODA for loan giving DAC countries (2018) Source: OECD (2019), ODA 2018 detailed summary. ODA, Official Development Assistance; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

CRDF (million $) 2,499.63 1,360.32 802.38 Source: Data from OECD DAC and the World Bank, projected by author. GNI, Gross National Income; ODA, Official Development Assistance; CRDF, Climate-Related Development Finance; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The scenario is projected for the next ten years, from 2021 to 2030. The baseline indicators in 2020 are set as 0.150% of ODA/GNI and 17.0% of CRDF/ODA due to the data of recent years (See <Appendix 5>). The goals, 0.3% of ODA/GNI and 30% of CRDF/ODA by 2030, are achievable under the optimistic scenario with 4.6% of the annual GNI growth rate, which is 0.015% of the yearly ODA/GNI increase rate, and 1.3% of annual CRDF/ODA increase rate. The scenario summary shows how ODA and CRDF would be changed in the moderate or the pessimistic scenario. While the annual GNI growth rate is not controllable, the Korean government could manage both ODA/GNI increase rate and CRDF/ODA increase rate. If the Korean government checks and updates these figures in the regular monitoring and evaluation process, the Korean government could efficiently manage annual contributions against the targets. 5. Limitations and Potential Unanticipated Consequences The Korean government could manage climate finance for developing countries better if development agencies spend more CRDF through adopting new financial measures with the specific target. However, as a traditional limitation, most donor countries may not meet the goal even though they set targets by themselves. For instance, The Korean government missed the self-setting goals twice, 0.25% by 2015, and 0.20% by 2020. Also, the considerable challenge comes from an ongoing pandemic, COVID-19. Although both donor and recipient countries face difficulties together, there are more potential casualties in donor countries such as the US and European countries in terms of statistics. Now many states suffer in the worldwide economic downturn. It means that donor countries, including Korea, would lose interest and capacity to support developing countries. Some scientists said that one of the reasons for pandemic diseases would be climate change, which could destroy wild animals’ habitat, and people would have more chances to contact virus-infected animals (Greenpeace, 2020). So, donor countries, including Korea, could have more interest in addressing climate change. However, with public health coming to the forefront of policymaking, the priority of climate change issues would most likely fall, and CRDF could be shrunk in the dwindling ODA due to the economic downturn. ## VI. CONCLUSION To tackle climate change issues for developing countries, the Korean government needs to mobilize more climate finance from three primary resources: ODA, other public sources, and private investment. However, some problems hinder the mobilization of climate finance: bureaucratic failure contributed to the fragmentation of implementation of CRDF from ODA; diffusion of authority in climate change policy implementation limits the government’s capacity to manage public climate funds; information asymmetry and the problem of uncertainty hinder private climate investment. In the strategy analysis, four alternatives are reviewed by four criteria: political feasibility, administrative feasibility, effectiveness, and efficiency. Upgraded status-quo, Alternative 1, is finally selected as a solution. Without a structural change in the government, the alternative seeks to find better ways: raise the efficiency of development agencies such as KOICA and Korea Eximbank in spending CRDF; attract private participation through sharing information and diversifying financial scheme for private investors. Japan, Germany, and France would be good examples to draw the strategy because the three countries are active in mobilizing climate finance globally with various policy options. Moreover, the three countries’ ODA structure with relatively high proportions of loans is comparable to Korea’s ODA. The Korean government could learn from the three countries’ experiences and apply practical measures to improve Korea’s climate finance. This study suggests the Korean government has three implications for improving climate finance for developing countries: setting specific goals in the government plan, implementing new financial schemes for private partners, and managing the whole process by regular monitoring and evaluation. First, the CRDF spending ratio needs to be on par with Japan, Germany, and France: 90% by development agencies such as KOICA and Korea Eximbank and 70% with a debt instrument. To realize this goal, the Korean government needs to set a specific target of CRDF/ODA in the 3rd Framework Plan of International Development Cooperation from 2021 to 2025. In a draft of the 3rd Framework Plan, “strengthening response and resilience to climate change” is a strategic objective out of five main objectives. So, the Korean government had better include the goals for CRDF in line with 0.3% of ODA/GNI and 30% of CRDF/ODA by 2030. Moreover, the CIDC would assign a CRDF disbursement ratio, 90% by development agencies, and 70% with a debt instrument, in an annual ODA implementation plan for every fiscal year. Second, the Korean government needs to ensure that development agencies actively use new financial schemes such as climate change funds and blended finance. KOICA and Korea Eximbank should increase pilot projects by using a new financial scheme with the private sector. That is the most crucial part of the implementation steps if the Korean government wants to make the plan succeed. KOICA and Korea Eximbank need more “trial and error’ opportunities, and these mistakes should be accepted by the government if there is no wrongful act. Although some advanced policy options are identified, the Korean government could not implement policies as expected. If there is no buffer zone for the failure, governmental agencies will follow the path-dependent route rather than seek innovative ways. Lastly, regular monitoring and evaluation have a pivotal role in checking progress to meet the goals. Also, scenario analysis helps understand the whole picture and factors such as annual GNI growth rate, ODA/GNI increase rate, and CRDF/ODA increase rate. While the annual GNI growth rate is not controllable, the Korean government could manage both ODA/GNI increase rate and CRDF/ODA increase rate. 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Retrieved from https://www.weforum.org/reports/green-investment-report-ways-and-means-unlock-private-finance-green-growth/ ## Appendices Appendix 1. Socio-ecological model (Improving Korea’s climate finance) UNFCCC, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; GCF, Green Climate Fund; PPP, Public Private Partnership. Appendix 2. Problem tree ODA, Official Development Assistance; CRDF, Climate-Related Development Finance. Appendix 3. Criteria alternative matrix Criterion Weight (100) 1. Upgraded Status Quo 2. Integration of ODA system 3. Governance change in CP 4. Combination of all Political feasibility 40 5 2 2 1 Administrative feasibility 20 4 3 3 3 Effectiveness 25 2 4 3 5 Efficiency 15 3 5 4 5 Total 375 315 275 300 Ranking 1 2 4 3 Scale: 1-lowest and 5-highest. ODA, Official Development Assistance; CP, Climate Policy. Appendix 4. Stakeholder analysis Stakeholder Type Stakes Resource/ influence Position on issue Key stakeholders Office for Government Policy Coordination (Prime Minister’s Secretariat) Public Better coordination among ministries; effectiveness between climate change and development aid Head of decision-making process, but many issues driven by each ministry; less power to the ministries than the president office (Blue House) Promoter; high power/high interested Ministry of Economy and Finance Public Burden to allocate more budget to ODA Have an authority for planning budget of the Korean government Neutral;high power/interested Ministry of Foreign Affairs Public Better international status of Korea Coordinating ministry for grants; cooperation with UN agencies Promoter; high power/high interested Ministry of Environment Public Meet the goal of NDC; reduce CO2 emissions Information about environment and climate change Promoter; high power/high interested Primary stakeholders Korea International Cooperation Agency Public More intervention in climate change issues; contribution to the SDGs Partnership with developing countries; overseas offices over 40 countries; applied to accredited entities by GCF (2nd from Korea) Promoter; medium power/high interested The Export-Import Bank of Korea Public Support Korean companies’ activities with other countries; contribution to the SDGs Involved in diverse climate finance initiatives (green bond, EDCF (ODA loans), and a part of ETS) Promoter: medium power/high interested Korea Development Bank Public Support Korean companies’ activities with other countries; The only accredited entity by GCF in Korea; Development Financial Institute (DFI) of Korea Promoter; medium power/high interested Korean Private Companies Private Expand investment and business in developing countries Some networks with other companies in developing countries Promoter; low power/high interested Korean Private Financial Institutions Private Expand investment and make more profit from the investment Resource for FDI; Private finance for investment Promoter; low power/high interested Secondary stakeholders Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy Public Keep competitiveness of Korean companies; Direct influence on Energy issues and Industry in Korea Neutral; high power/ interested Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Public Better energy infrastructure for farmers; adaptation issues in Korea Some budget to support farmers and cooperation with other countries Neutral; medium power / interested Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport Public Energy management system for buildings and transportation Information about sectors Neutral; high power / interested Ministry of Science and ICT Public Strengthen capacity of Korean Technology Some budget support for technology innovation Neutral; medium power / interested External stakeholders UNFCCC Public Meet the NDC goals; more climate finance Global Network; Supervision of NDCs Promoter; low power /high interested UNEP Public Meet the NDC goals; more climate finance Global Network; Information about the whole environment issue Promoter; low power/high interested Green Climate Fund (GCF) Public Meet the NDC goals; more climate finance Financial mechanism to cooperate between public and private actors Promoter; low power/High interested Governments of Developed Countries (ODA Donor Countries) Public Contribution to SDGs and climate change issues Peer review and pressure; share the experiences Promoter; low power/high interested Governments of Developing Countries (ODA Recipient Countries) Public Need more finance for development and climate change (adaptation) Influence through international agreement like Paris Agreement Promoter; low power/high interested OECD DAC Public More aid and activities to solve development and climate change issues Network among donors and recipients; information and data Promoter; low power/high interested Non-Korean Companies Public/private More opportunity to join the projects Experiences to implement projects in developing countries Promoter; low power/interested Non-Korean Financial Institutions Public/private Better profit and performance from their investment Considerable size of fund and network Promoter; low power/interested International Environment NGOs Private Reduction of GHG; better environment Advocacy to the government Promoter; low power/high interested Universities, Research Institutes Public/private Research for solving climate change Introduce new technology or policy alternatives to deal with climate change Promoter; low power/high interested ODA, Official Development Assistance; NDC, Nationally Determined Contribution; GCF, Green Climate Fund; FDI, Foreign Direct Investment; UNFCCC, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; UNEP, United Nations Environment Program; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; NGO, non-governmental organization. Appendix 5. Projection of Korea’s ODA and CRDF by 2030 Year GNI (projected, mil.$) ODA/GNI (target, %) ODA (projected, mil.$) CRDF/ODA (target, %) CRDF (projected, mil.$)
2020 1,770,788.95 0.15 17
2021 1,852,309.35 0.165 3,056.31 18.3 559.3
2022 1,937,582.64 0.18 3,487.65 19.6 683.58
2023 2,026,781.59 0.195 3,952.22 20.9 826.01
2024 2,120,086.92 0.21 4,452.18 22.2 988.38
2025 2,217,687.67 0.225 4,989.80 23.5 1,172.60
2026 2,319,781.59 0.24 5,567.48 24.8 1,380.73
2027 2,426,575.52 0.255 6,187.77 26.1 1,615.01
2028 2,538,285.85 0.27 6,853.37 27.4 1,877.82
2029 2,655,138.89 0.285 7,567.15 28.7 2,171.77
2030 2,777,371.41 0.3 8,332.11 30 2,499.63

Source: Data from OECD DAC and the World Bank, projected by author.

ODA, Official Development Assistance; CRDF, Climate-Related Development Finance; GNI, Gross National Income; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development